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When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks  
Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant1 
 
I discuss Kant’s conception of conscience in the context of his conceptions of two 
phenomena central to Kant’s practical philosophy: ordinary moral-cognition and self-
deception. Conscience in Kant has the role of a reflective watch-dog: It watches over or 
reflects about how cautiously an agent uses her rational capacities when she reasons about 
concrete matters of duty. In my paper I discuss a problem that has not yet received its due 
attention. Conscience can warn agents every time they are about to transgress the moral 
law and it retrospectively reproaches agents for transgressions, yet Kant believes that 
there is also a natural propensity to self-deception. Self-deception, however, is only 
possible if agents can successfully hide from themselves the moral implications of some of 
their actions or present them as morally innocent. I argue that Kant’s model of an internal 
court of conscience is inadequate to account for the pervasive threat self-deception poses. I 
propose a modified model instead, which I call “internal-panel-model”. 
 
 
Kant’s conception of conscience has recently become a matter of intense interest and 
debate in the Kant literature.2 I will focus on a problem that has not yet received its due 
attention. Conscience can warn agents every time they are about to transgress the moral 
law and it retrospectively reproaches agents for transgressions, yet Kant believes that 
there is also a natural propensity to self-deception. Self-deception, however, is only 
possible if agents can successfully hide from themselves the moral implications of some 
of their actions or present them as morally innocent. I will begin by outlining Kant’s 
conception of ordinary cognition of duty and of self-deception or rationalizing (sec.1). I 
will then provide a brief overview of possible functions of conscience in Kant and explain 
Kant’s conception of conscience as a reflective watch-dog: Conscience does not judge 
directly about our duty in concrete cases but it watches over or reflects about how 
cautiously an agent uses her rational capacities when she reasons about concrete 
matters of duty (sec.2). Finally, I will argue that Kant’s model of an internal court of 
                                                 
1 This paper is indebted to discussion with and feedback from Jens Timmerman, Claudia Blöser, Marcia 
Baron, Oliver Sensen, Paul Guyer, Nora Kassan, Adrian Piper, Joe Saunders, Alix Cohen, Sophie Møller and 
Samuel Kahn. I am grateful to the UK Kant Society, the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities in 
Essen, and to the British Society for the History of Philosophy for the opportunity to present my material, 
and to the philosophy departments of the universities of St Andrews, Stirling and Göttingen for supporting 
my research. 
2 For older pieces on conscience see Funke (1971), Paton (1979), Heubült (1980), and Hill’s essays 
reprinted in Hill (2002, ch.9, 11). For recent literature see Velleman (1999), Hoffmann (2002), 
Timmermann (2006), Moyar (2008), Wood (2008, ch.10), Ware (2009), Guyer (2010), Esser (2013), 
Vujošević (2014), Schmidt, Schönecker (2014a, 2014b) Sensen (2015), Kahn (forthcoming). 
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conscience is inadequate to account for the pervasive threat self-deception poses. I will 
propose a modified model instead, which I call “internal-panel-model” (sec.3). 
My account of conscience differs from other accounts advanced in the Kant 
literature in that I believe that we can understand the specific role conscience plays in 
Kant only if we pay attention to how some of the functions commonly ascribed to 
conscience are in Kant’s ethics fulfilled by conceptions other than conscience and how 
conscience relates to these functions. Furthermore, I believe that we can understand the 
function of conscience better if we pay attention to cases in which something goes wrong 
in an agent’s critical self-assessment. I therefore analyse conscience in the context of two 
phenomena central to Kant’s practical philosophy: ordinary moral-cognition and self-
deception. My paper thus stands in a recent tradition of shedding light on conscience via 
its relation to other elements of Kant’s practical philosophy, such as indirect duty 
(Timmermann 2006), the Fact of Reason (Moyar 2008), the duty to self-knowledge 
(Ware 2009), and the Aesthetic Preliminary Concepts (Guyer 2010). 
Two notes before we begin. Firstly, I will assume that there is sufficient unity in 
Kant’s conception of conscience in the 1790s for his writings on conscience from this 
decade to shed light on each other.3 Furthermore, I will occasionally make reference to 
pre-critical (as well as critical) lecture notes. Reference to pre-critical lecture notes, 
however, always comes with the implicit caveat that Kant’s practical philosophy, at the 
time, might have been different from his critical conception and cannot be used as strong 
support for an interpretation of his mature conception of conscience. 
Secondly, I will make use of the distinction between first-order and second-order 
judgement. By a “first-order judgement” I mean a judgement about what my duty is in a 
particular situation (for instance: “I ought not to make a promise to this particular 
person to pay back money she might lend me, if I do not have the intention of paying her 
back.”). Kant sometimes calls these judgements “objective”, since they have an object 
other than the agent, namely, actions (VI:401.5). By a “second-order judgement” or 
“reflective judgement” I mean a judgement about the reasoning that leads to first-order 
judgements (for instance: “I have reasoned about my options for how to extricate myself 
from financial predicaments with due caution.”). Kant sometimes calls these judgements 
                                                 
3 Moyar (2008, 328), by contrast, believes that Kant’s conception of conscience between 1791 and 1797 
“shows a remarkable lack of uniformity”. The most notable tension in Kant’s conception of conscience in 
the 1790s is due to claims Kant makes about conscience as an Aesthetical Preliminary Concept in the 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. 
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“subjective” (VI:401.7). By this he does not mean that these judgements concern 
pleasure and pain or discretionary matters, but the agent or subject herself, as opposed 
to her actions.  
 
1. Universalization and Self-Deception 
In this section, I will lay out those elements of Kant’s philosophy without which we 
cannot properly understand conscience. These elements are the capacity of every 
rational agent to obtain moral knowledge via a simple universalization procedure (1.1), 
and a propensity to self-deception (1.2) 
 
1.1 The Common Universalization Test 
Kant explicitly states that “it is not conscience, which judges whether an action is in 
general right or wrong” (VI:186.2-3, see also VI:400.27-31). In fact, conscience 
presupposes the ability to tell right from wrong (XXVII:576.1-6, 617.10-5). First-order 
moral cognition is a matter of the understanding (ibid.614.31-615.5).4 Kant believes that 
every rational human being can find out what ought to be done in relatively easy ways. 
In the Groundwork and Second Critique, Kant describes moral cognition as an agent 
asking herself questions pertaining to the universalisability of her intended course of 
action.5 The moral significance of universalization is something all agents “always 
actually have before their eyes and use as the standard of judging” (IV:403.35-7). Even 
without philosophical training an agent can ask herself “would I actually be content that 
my maxim […] should hold as a universal law” (IV:403.5-8, see also XXIX:628.32-4)? 
Common agents in their everyday moral evaluations can make use of pre-philosophical, 
common universalisation tests to check whether a maxim is morally permissible.6 
According to Kant, the common universalisation test can be applied “in the very 
quickest and yet undeceptive way” (IV:403.4). It is within the power of every rational 
                                                 
4 There is consensus in the Kant literature that conscience is not primarily concerned with first-order 
matters. A notable exception is Guyer (2010, 145-6) who sees conscience as a capacity “to seek and listen 
to the kind of moral law that applies to particular cases, namely, particular maxims”, i.e., to apply general 
moral rules to particular cases (seeking) and being motivated to obey these rules (listening). Esser (2013, 
277fn.16) convincingly argues that the idea that conscience is a form of power of judgment, which applies 
general rules to particular cases, rests on a misinterpretation of a passage in the Religion (VI:186.10-1).  
5 “I ask myself” (IV:403.3-6), “I just ask myself” (ibid.21), “he still has enough conscience to ask himself” 
(IV:422.19), “[y]et he still asks himself” (IV:423.2-5).  
6 See also IV:421.24-423.35, V:27.22, 36.4-6, 44.2-3, 69.20-70.9. 
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human agent and does not require a philosophical background, “wide-ranging 
acuteness” (IV:403.19) or experience “with regard to the course of the world” 
(IV:403.19-20). Kant sometimes overstates this when he says that an agent is “certain on 
the spot” (VIII:287.16-7), and “without hesitation” (V:36.28-9) what her duty is. We will 
see below that it would be in contradiction to what Kant says about the function of 
conscience as a watch-dog to interpret these statements as saying that finding out what 
ought to be done is never difficult.7  
In the Groundwork and the Second Critique, Kant is optimistic that common 
universalization tests are sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong in concrete 
cases. Agents might only need an occasional reminder to make use of this test, or a 
reproach if they fail to do so. Accordingly, conscience is only mentioned three times in 
the two works (IV:404.22, 422.19, V:98.14). I will argue below that conscience observes 
the way agents apply common universalization tests to concrete cases. Conscience is 
therefore a matter of Kant’s more applied ethics, particularly of the Metaphysics of 
Morals. Once Kant focuses on concrete moral questions, and outright difficult ones such 
as the casuistical cases, he acknowledges that conscience has to watch over an agent’s 
reasoning, since some moral questions require cautious reasoning. That Kant discussed 
conscience in lectures that pre-date the Religion (see for instance XXVII:196-200, 296-8, 
351-7) indicates that even pre-1790s he is aware of the importance of conscience. He 
brackets conscience in his published works in the 1780s, because it plays no role for the 
Groundwork’s and Second Critique’s foundational enterprise.8 
 
1.2 Rationalizing  
Given the alleged quickness and undeceptiveness of the common universalization test 
(see IV:403.4) we may wonder: How is it possible that agents get their judgement about 
duty wrong? Kant addresses this issue in his discussion of rationalizing [Vernünfteln].9 
Since Kant’s thoughts on rationalizing are scattered throughout his works, interpreters 
often fail to realize the full extent to which Kant discusses the different forms and 
                                                 
7 The previous two paragraphs are a condensed version of Sticker (2015b). There I also discuss the moral-
epistemological function of humanity or rational nature, which I have to bracket here. 
8 This is the explanation advanced by Timmermann (2006). 
9 I will follow Timmermann (2011) and use “rationalizing” as a translation of “Vernünfteln”. 
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aspects of this form of self-deception.10 
Kant’s most prominent discussion of rationalizing is the penultimate paragraph of 
Groundwork I:  
 
Innocence is a glorious [1] thing, but then again it is very sad that it is so hard to 
preserve and so easily seduced [2]. Because of this even wisdom – which otherwise 
probably consists more in behaviour than in knowledge – yet needs science too, not in 
order to learn from it, but to obtain access and durability for its prescription. The human 
being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty [3] – 
which reason represents to him as so worthy of the highest respect – in his needs and 
inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now 
reason issues its prescriptions unrelentingly, yet without promising anything to the 
inclinations, and hence, as it were, with reproach and disrespect for those claims, which 
are so vehement and yet seem so reasonable (and will not be eliminated by any command). 
But from this there arises a natural dialectic [4], i.e. a propensity to rationalize against 
those strict laws of duty [5], and to cast doubt [6] on their validity, or at least their 
purity [7] and strictness [8], and, where possible, to make them better suited to our 
wishes and inclinations, i.e. fundamentally to corrupt them and deprive them of their 
entire dignity [9], something that in the end even common practical reason cannot 
endorse. (IV:404.37-405.19) 
 
The common agent without philosophical training is in a state of “innocence” [1]. 
She has a correct understanding of what matters morally, namely, universality, and she 
can make use of this notion to discover her duties in concrete cases. Innocence, however, 
is difficult to preserve and the common agent is “easily seduced” [2]. The tension 
between unconditional commands of duty and happiness, which constitutes “a powerful 
counterweight to all the commands of duty” [3], gives rise to a “natural dialectic” [4]. 
This dialectic is natural in the sense that our rational and our sensuous natures are in 
tension with each other, and that this tension is unavoidable for finite rational agents. 
Kant characterizes the natural dialectical in the Groundwork as identical to11 “a 
propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty” [5]. Rationalizing is 
characterized as the attempt to cast doubt on central elements of morality or to modify 
one’s way of reasoning about duty. Such a modification, Kant fears, would fundamentally 
                                                 
10 For exemplary cases of rationalizing see for instance VI:70.fn., 77.26-78.2, 168.8-170.11, 192.1-202.5, 
430.19-26, VIII:265.28-266.5, LK:154-7, 192-3. There is a growing interest in rationalizing in the Kant 
literature. See Schönecker (1997), Guyer (2000), Piper (2008), Shell (2009), Sticker (2015a, sec.3), van 
Ackeren, Sticker (2015, sec.3). 
11 Kant uses the strong “i.e.” [d.i.] [5] “this is” to characterize the relation between the natural dialectic and 
the propensity to rationalize.  
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“corrupt” the strict laws of duty, “and deprive them of their entire dignity” [9].12  
Corruption is a twofold problem. Firstly, a corrupted agent reasons incorrectly 
about morality, namely, according to other than the strict and pure standard of 
universality. Secondly, a corrupted agent’s actions do not express unconditional 
commitment to duty, since the agent might not have acted, had certain grounds of 
excuses obtained. Rationalizing represents an epistemic as well as a motivational 
problem. The two main strategies of rationalizing Kant mentions are “casting doubt” [6] 
on the purity [7] and strictness [8] of duty. Purity firstly demands that nothing empirical, 
i.e., inclinations, an agent’s non-obligatory goals, etc. function as criteria for what is 
moral (the cognitive component). Secondly, purity demands that an agent’s obligatory 
actions or omissions are not motivated by pathological desires, but by respect for the 
moral law (the motivational component). Agents who reason without due regard for 
purity believe that other factors than universality, such as consequences or external 
authorities, can inform their reasoning about duty and provide moral reasons for 
actions. Strictness is the claim that moral commands are always of supreme authority 
and, at least in the case of perfect duties, never admit of exceptions. Agents who reason 
without due regard for strictness believe that the normative force of moral commands 
can, in exceptional circumstances, be outweighed by other considerations.  
Kant is adamant that disobedience to the moral law can only mean to “permit 
ourselves (with all respect for it) just a few exceptions” (IV:424.36-7). Rationalizing only 
makes sense for agents who are in principle committed to morality and who want to 
retain their self-esteem as moral agents.13 The rationaliser’s commitment to duty, 
however, is not unconditional. She is committed either unconditionally to an impure 
conception of morality that combines elements of morality and inclinations (no purity), 
or committed conditionally to a pure conception of morality, i.e., she believes that there 
can be exceptions and excuses (no strictness). In the former case the impure elements 
are part of the agent’s conception of morality itself. In the latter case agents still act from 
a pure principle when they act from what they take to be the moral option, but their 
obedience is conditioned on other factors than duty. An agent who has abandoned purity 
perceives her inclinations and personal goals as having a say in the question of what is 
permissible or even obligatory. The agent might believe that she is fully morally justified 
                                                 
12 Again Kant uses the strong “i.e.” [9]. Adapting one’s conception of morality and corruption is identical. 
13 See also VI:36.1-33, 321.38-9, XXIX:609.34-6, 629.2-5. 
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in what she is doing, even when she is not. An agent who has abandoned strictness, by 
contrast, is aware that there are strong moral considerations that speak in favour of 
disregarding personal happiness for the sake of the moral option, but she believes that 
there are also grounds of excuses for not heeding moral commands.14 
The distinction between taking oneself to be merely excused and believing to be 
justified is not always clear-cut. The goal of rationalizing is to boost ones perceived 
moral standing, while at the same time not having to forego satisfaction of inclinations. 
Justifications are more potent for this purpose than excuses, since justifications suggest 
that the agent does not need to morally improve at all. When the agent still has a firm 
grasp of what is right and wrong, however, the only thing she can do to rationalize is to 
invent an excuse for an action that she acknowledges as wrong.  
 
In what follows, I will show what role conscience plays for Kant given that for him it does 
not provide first-order moral insight, and given that Kant stresses the pervasiveness of a 
human being’s propensity to self-deception.  
 
2. Conscience as a Reflective Watch-Dog 
In this section, I argue that we should understand conscience as a reflective watch-dog 
concerned with second-order reflection on the cautiousness of our first-order processes 
of cognizing our duty (2.1). I will then discuss the alleged infallibility of conscience in 
contrast to the fallibility of our first-order judgements about duty (2.2). This will lead us 
to the problem of how there can be self-deception before the internal court. 
 
2.1 The Reflective Function of Conscience 
Kant scholars have ascribed to conscience in Kant at least three different functions or 
combinations thereof: (i) Conscience makes my duty my duty parallel to the I think of the 
First Critique, which makes my thoughts my thoughts15; (ii) conscience has a 
                                                 
14 Kant claims that the agent who makes an exception for himself, as opposed to the agent who adopts an 
immoral rule as his maxim, still “can at the same time detest his transgression” (VI:321.38, see also 
ibid.379-380.fn.). I loosely follow Austin’s (1961, 176) distinction between justifications and excuses. In 
the former case someone accepts responsibility but denies that an action was bad, in the latter case 
someone accepts that an action was bad but denies full, or even any, responsibility. 
15 See XVIII:579.4-5, XXVII:613.37-614.9, Moyar (2008, 350), Vujošević (2014).  
 8 
motivational function16; (iii) conscience is reflective: it warns an agent before an action 
that she cannot be certain that what she intends to do is right or it makes itself felt after 
an action in the form of pangs of conscience.17  
In what follows, I am concerned with the reflective dimension of conscience (iii). 
Before I begin, let me say a word about the other two functions. Function (i) is, I believe, 
already fulfilled by the agent’s awareness of being under the moral law; an awareness 
that is discussed extensively and without any appeal to conscience in Kant’s Second 
Critique’s discussion of the Fact of Reason (see esp.V:30.32-5). It would be strange if an 
agent who is subject to the moral law needed an additional capacity on top of her 
awareness of duty to understand that her duty is not anyone else’s but her duty. 
Understanding my duty as obligating me is exactly what awareness of being under the 
moral law means. One might argue that conscience simply is my awareness that I am 
under the moral law. In this case, however, conscience would not serve a function 
distinctive of the Fact of Reason.18 However, if conscience presupposes first-order 
judgments, as we will see it does, it cannot be identical to our awareness of being under 
the moral law. We could not make first-order judgments without this awareness already 
in place.   
Furthermore, reason when critically reflecting on its own workings can affect an 
agent’s mind or her sensuous side (ii). Its verdicts can be the ground of “repentance” 
(V:98.28) and of “pain one feels from the pangs of conscience” (VI:394.3-5, see also 
V:98.29-30). According to my reading, the warnings of conscience can lead an agent to 
refrain from acting when she realizes that she is not in a position to be certain that what 
                                                 
16 See VI:400.30 and Guyer’s (2010, 145-6) reading of conscience as part of an empirically informed theory 
of moral motivation. Moyar (2008, sec.6), like Guyer, stresses the authority and motivational role of 
conscience. He, however, adds the caveat that this stress is a Fichte inspired reading of Kant. Vujošević 
(2014, 450) argues that “conscience itself is not a moral motive”, but it “has an inescapable role to play in 
the process of our motivation to act morally”. 
17 See for instance Hill (2002, 280-1). Moyar (2008, 338) believes that conscience is a reflective capacity 
“directed at my process of judgment and my grounds for thinking that I have done the best that I possibly 
can in arriving at my judgment”. Moyar (ibid.345) also argues that Kant “invests conscience with so much 
authority that the first-order/second-order distinction becomes completely untenable”, or that the 
question: “Is this the right maxim?” is indistinguishable from: “Do I believe that this is the right action?” 
(see ibid.346). I do not share this criticism: The two orders only collapse if conscience judges about the 
certainty of beliefs. Conscience, however, judges about an agent’s way of reasoning (see below). The 
question conscience asks is rather: “Did I reason about a situation with due caution?”. This is different 
from the question what maxim or action is right. First- and second-order judgements are about different 
objects (actions/maxims vs. reasoning) and they employ different methods (universalization tests vs. 
critical self-examination). See also Grenberg (2013, 180fn.10) who argues convincingly that Kant does not 
collapse the two questions. 
18 Moyar (2008) has sympathy for this reading. Textual support for such a much more fundamental role of 
conscience than what the other passages on conscience support is in VI:399.1-403.6. 
 9 
she is about to do is morally permissible. This is different from being motivated by 
respect for the moral law. In the case of respect agents act or refrain from acting because 
they are positively certain that an action is obligatory or forbidden, whereas in the case 
of conscience agents refrain from acting because they realize that they are not certain 
that their action would be morally right. Whether the latter is morally worthy or merely 
a prudential means to avoid pangs of conscience is a question I cannot answer here. The 
motivational function of conscience presupposes a verdict of conscience or the outcome 
of the reflective function, which I will discuss for the rest of this paper. 
 
Kant characterizes conscience as “practical reason holding the human being’s duty 
before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law” 
(VI:400.27-8). Conscience is concerned with concrete cases and with the moral status of 
the agent herself (her “acquittal or condemnation”), and it comes into effect in every 
morally relevant case (“every case that comes under a law”). Furthermore, conscience is 
reflective: a “moral faculty of judgement, passing judgement upon itself” (VI:186.10-11).19 
It is important that Kant does not claim that conscience passes judgement on the agent, 
but on an agent’s moral faculty of judgement (“itself”) of which conscience is a part (see 
VI:400.27-8). Conscience critically scrutinizes first-order judgments and the reasoning 
that leads to these judgments.  
Kant explicitly acknowledges that an agent can err in her “objective judgement as 
to whether something is a duty or not” (VI:401.5-6). He contrasts the fallibility of first-
order moral judgments with the infallibility of conscience (VIII:268.13-8, XXVII:615.32-6 
– see my sec.2.2).20 Conscience judges whether the agent is or was warranted to believe 
that something is or is not her duty. Conscience is reason when reason “judges itself”, 
                                                 
19 Timmermann (2006, 295) notes that this reflective function of conscience is coherent with the standard 
Protestant conception of conscience at the time as something more narrow than an agent’s sense of right 
and wrong. He (ibid.295) argues that conscience is “the power [...] – within every human agent – that 
acknowledges the need to conform to moral standards”. The moral standards themselves are provided by 
reason, not conscience.  
20 Timmermann (2006, 306) believes that the “possibility of objective errors [about my duty in concrete 
cases] […] seems to undermine the very foundation of Kantian ethics”, namely, the idea that every rational 
human agent has insight into what she is morally required to do. On Timmermann’s conception agents can 
fail to act on what they are aware of as obligatory, but they cannot have false beliefs about what their duty 
is in a concrete situation. My interpretation of conscience, in contrast to Timmermann’s, accommodates 
mistakes in objective judgements without undermining the foundation of Kant’s ethics. Rational agents 
always have what it takes to reach the correct judgment in moral matters, namely, the ability to make use 
of the standard of universality (see sec.1.1). If they reason incorrectly they can be held morally 
accountable for it, since it would have been possible and sufficiently easy for them to judge correctly.  
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according to the question of “whether it has actually undertaken, with all caution 
[Behutsamkeit]” the “examination of actions” (VI:186.17-8).21 Caution is a property of a 
process.22 We can reason cautiously, or with lack of caution. Conscience warns agents not 
to perform a concrete action when, due to lack of a cautious application of common 
universalization tests, an agent cannot be certain of the moral permissibility of her 
action.23 
The best illustration for the function of conscience in Kant is the Religion’s 
inquisitor who condemns a heretic to death. The inquisitor is “firm in the belief” 
(VI:186.30) that he is permitted, maybe even morally required to put to death a heretic. 
The inquisitor does what he believes is right, but, according to Kant, he acts against his 
conscience, since he “could not have been entirely certain” (ibid.29) that putting to death 
the heretic is right.24 There is no sound deliberative route that leads to the belief that the 
heretic ought to die, since, firstly, it is absolutely certain that taking a human life because 
of a person’s faith is wrong (VI:186.36-7, see also IX:69.13-70.8), and, secondly, 
everything that tells otherwise is “a matter of historical documentation and never 
apodictically certain” (VI:187.3-4, see also XXVII:614.11-30). Only an insufficient use of 
rational capacities, which ignores that which is absolutely certain and which is based on 
questionable evidence, lets the inquisitor reach his firmly held but mistaken conviction. 
Conscience is supposed to warn agents of unwarranted moral beliefs.25 
                                                 
21 See also VIII:268.7-8. Wood, Di Giovanni (1996, 203) translate “Behutsamkeit” as “diligence”. “Caution” 
better preserves the original meaning of the word: to be aware of or to protect oneself of danger (see 
Adelung vol.1, col.817-8). I am grateful to Jens Timmermann for suggesting the term “caution”. 
22 The same is true of the term “conscientious” and the German “gewissenhaft”. Both aptly describe the 
working of conscience as concerned with the question as to whether agents reached their moral 
convictions in a reliable way. Sensen (2015, 127-8) argues plausibly that being conscientious for Kant 
means that a moral judgment was “cautiously examined” [sorgfältig geprüft] by the agent (see also 
ibid.130-1).  
23 In the Vigilantius lecture notes from 1793/4 conscientiousness appears as a matter of a “sincere 
examination” [aufrichtige Prüfung] of what we take to be certain (XXVII:615.19). It is the role of conscience 
“to obtain consciousness that one has performed the examination with great thought” (XXVII:619.27-8). 
See also Vujošević (2014, 465) who believes that conscience assesses “our way of judging whether an 
action is right or wrong”. Vujošević, however, is not always clear about the object of assessment. She claims 
that conscience judges our “maxim-formation and adoption” (ibid.) or incentives (ibid.470). The latter 
seems very different from our way of reasoning. 
24 In Vigilantius the inquisitor is said to “take himself to be justified” in his deeds (XXVII:615.29).  
25 Esser (2013, 283-4) thinks that conscience is not supposed to scrutinize the use of rational capacities, 
but the motives of actions (see also Vujošević 2014, 461). This interpretation is contradicted by the 
inquisitor case. The inquisitor got wrong the question what his duty is. He does not merely lack the right 
motivation. Schmidt, Schönecker (2014a, 283) make a very convincing case against the idea that the 
scrutiny of conscience extends to motivation: If conscience pronounced a verdict about the motives of 
actions, it should be possible to know whether our actions are morally worthy, something Kant 
strenuously denies (A/B:278/334, 551/579, VI: 25.5-6, 38.7-12, 51.7-21, 70.1-71.20, 75.8-76.1, VI.451.21-
36). 
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Conscience is thus a reflective Watch-Dog: It critically “observes” (VI:438.14) that 
agents think about the universalizability of a maxim with due caution, and when it 
detects mistakes it barks in order to warn the agent (before the action) or to reproach 
her if she ignored the warning (after the action). Furthermore, agents can presumably 
reason with so little caution or be so convinced of their views that they do not have the 
time or do not see the need for critical reflection before an action. In this case conscience 
will condemn the action once agents critically reflect about the action in retrospection. 
Conscience can never precede moral reasoning. It presupposes moral reasoning as the 
object of its reflection. Conscience can, however, precede action. Agents can notice 
insufficiencies in their reasoning before they act, during their action, as well as in 
retrospection.26 
Kant’s idea that conscience is concerned with second-order or subjective 
judgements is already anticipated in his legal philosophy. We will discuss below in detail 
the juridical metaphor Kant uses to explain the proceedings of conscience: the court of 
law. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that it is a “common fault (vitium subreptionis) 
of experts on right” to mix up the rightful principle a court is “bound to adopt for its own 
use (hence for a subjective purpose)” with an “objective” principle of what is right in 
itself. Both principles are “very different” (VI:297.21-9). Kant here already distinguishes 
between a subjective principle that structures the court proceedings for the purpose of 
judging agents, and an objective principle of right. Whilst this characterization leaves 
open that juridical courts are deficient in their subjective judgements, since they do not 
base their verdicts on what is right in itself, we will see below that in the case of an 
internal court there is no such deficiency. The internal court is infallible in its subjective 
judgements. Its judgements are about a completely different (a reflexive) matter than 
objective judgments of moral agents. 
Owen Ware (2009) in a paper on conscience and the duty to self-knowledge, comes 
closest to the conception of conscience I advocated so far. He believes that while 
conscience is also concerned with the question of “whether the agent’s actions really do 
line up with the judgements of practical understanding” (ibid.693) or whether we did 
what we believed to be our duty, another function of conscience is to judge “the care the 
agent applies (or fails to apply) in the act of examining what action she ought or ought 
                                                 
26 See explicitly “when it comes, or has come, to a deed, conscience speaks involuntary and unavoidably” 
(VI:401.15-6). See also XXVII:198.17-24.  
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not take” (ibid.). The main difference between our respective accounts is that Ware 
seems to believe that the infallibility of conscience makes self-deception impossible or at 
least that self-deception can only be successful until conscience becomes active. 
Furthermore, he only discusses self-deception as a form of opacity about our motives. I, 
by contrast, believe that Kant’s conception of self-deception is much richer and more 
substantial, for instance pertaining to general structures of one’s conception of morality, 
such as strictness and purity (see my sec.1.2). Kant’s optimism about the accuracy and 
force of conscience must be reconciled with his pessimism about how dishonest agents 
tend to be with themselves. 
 
2.2 The Infallibility of Conscience 
After we have established that conscience critically watches over an agent’s moral 
reasoning, we now turn to Kant’s claim that in her reflective judgement about whether 
the agent reasoned cautiously about her duty an agent “cannot err” (ibid.401.8, see also 
VIII:268.10-3, XXVII:615.32-6).27 
The claim that conscience is infallible – and even stronger that an erring 
conscience would be an “absurdity” (VI:401.5, VIII:268.11) – is an enduring source of 
puzzlement for Kant scholars. The claim becomes much easier to stomach if we bear in 
mind that the infallibility of conscience does not imply that our first-order moral 
judgments about duty are infallible.28 Kant explains the infallibility of conscience as 
follows: “I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgement as to whether I have 
submitted it to my practical reason (here in its role as judgement) for such a judgement” 
(VI:401.6-8). The “it” here is most naturally understood to refer back to the objective or 
first-order judgment, which Kant discusses immediately before the passage quoted. 
Infallibility of conscience then does not actually pertain to the verdict of conscience 
itself, but to the judgment that I did critically scrutinize my first-order judgment or that I 
submitted it to the process of the internal court.29 
                                                 
27 The standard conception of conscience at the time was that conscience can err. See Baumgarten 
reprinted in Kant’s Academy Edition (XXVII:781) and Crusius (1767, §138-41). In pre-critical lectures Kant 
himself thought of conscience as fallible (XXVII:42.32-7, 197.36-198.9, 354.39-355.27). 
28 Paton (1979) is very skeptical of Kant’s infallibility claim and argues, correctly I believe, that we can 
only make sense of it, if we understand conscience as being about second-order matters.   
29 Hill (2002, 302-3.fn.50) suggests that conscience judges always correctly, but we might fail to submit an 
action to the scrutiny of conscience. The claim that conscience cannot err is therefore somewhat 
“exaggerated” (Hill 2002, 241, see also ibid.348). I agree that the claim is exaggerated, but for almost the 
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Kant’s almost pompous claim that an erring conscience is an absurdity strongly 
contrasts with the rather deflationary explanation he provides for this statement in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. In the Theodicy essay he explains conscience is infallible because I 
cannot err in my belief that I am convinced that something is right, if I am in fact 
convinced that it is right (VIII:268.15-8). According to this notion, infallibility almost 
sounds like a tautology. Kant probably thought that on top of infallibility about whether I 
did submit my judgment to critical scrutiny and that I cannot err in my belief that I am 
convinced that something is right, the process of conscience itself is set up in such a way 
that without interference by rationalizing conscience would not err. It is only due to the 
agent being corrupted and buying into a transformed conception of morality that the 
verdict of conscience errs. Conscience viewed in isolation of corrupting influences might 
be infallible indeed – after all, why would it fail?  
According to my conception, conscience is in an ideal position to get it right every 
time, but it is not actually infallible. I admit that this is an attempt to explain away many 
of the problematic aspects of Kant’s claim that conscience is infallible. This, however, is 
the only appropriate reaction to this claim if we keep in mind that Kant also stresses the 
propensity to self-deception as an element of the human condition. We must understand 
the infallibility claim such that it is still intelligible why agents are constantly tempted to 
engage in self-deception, and this would not be the case if self-deception, due to the 
infallibility of conscience, was impossible.30   
Kan’s discussion of conscience aims to capture an agent’s way of critically 
reflecting on her way of approaching moral questions. It works on a different framework 
than first-order reasoning about concrete moral matters, and it hence offers a partly 
external perspective on this reasoning; a perspective which can have diagnostic 
functions. This is a deflationary understanding of conscience, but I believe that it 
captures Kant’s intentions in so far as they can be defended and insofar as they fit with 
the rest of his philosophy. We must now turn directly to the question of how critical self-
evaluation sits with the pervasiveness of self-deception. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
opposite reason as Hill: The verdict of conscience can err, but an agent cannot be mistaken as to whether 
she submitted her moral judgement to the scrutiny of conscience 
30 Other deflationary readings who rather aim to explain the claim away are Wood (2008, 190-1), Ware 
(2009, 692-5). Wood explicitly acknowledges the difficulty of understanding the infallibility claim in the 
context of self-deception. 
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3. Internal Courts and Internal Panels 
Agents may “artificialize” [künsteln] as much as they want to represent moral 
transgressions as “unintentional fault” or mere “oversight”; they cannot “reduce to 
silence the prosecutor within” (V:98.13-21) or “bribe reason” (VI:77.27). If conscience 
cannot be silenced or be partial (bribed) and if it becomes active in every morally 
relevant case (VI:400.27-8), then how could agents ever escape its reprimands other 
than through strict obedience to the law? If they could not, it would be inexplicable how 
agents can be in constant danger of engaging in rationalizing. They might attempt it a 
few times and realize that it leads them nowhere and then either reason about their duty 
according to the strictness and purity of the moral law and act on the outcome of this 
reasoning or suffer pangs of conscience. This, however, would be in tension with Kant’s 
notion that rationalizing is the actualization of a propensity rooted in human nature, and 
thus something that does not simply go away after a while (see my sec.1.2 [4-5]). In 
addition, Kant believes that the transition from common rational cognition of duty to 
practical philosophy is necessitated “on practical grounds” by the danger of rationalizing 
(IV:405.20-35). If this danger were only transitory, then Kant’s critical practical 
philosophy would not serve an important practical function. The philosopher could 
simply wait until agents discover that all rationalizing is in vain. 
There must be something agents can expect to get out of their rationalizing. Indeed, 
Kant admits that there can be “opium” administered to conscience (VI:78.32-5). 
Conscience can be “stunned” or “put to sleep” temporarily, though even the most 
thorough self-deceiver cannot avoid “waking up from time to time” and hear the “fearful 
voice” of conscience (VI:438.13-23).31 These metaphors are best understood as referring 
to excuses for actions, which the agent acknowledges as wrong. Once conscience has 
pronounced an agent guilty, the agent can wonder about whether she is fully responsible 
for her action, i.e., whether there are excuses or mitigating circumstances. Kant says that 
whilst no finite agent endowed with practical reason is without conscience (VI:400.23-
25), agents may pay no heed to its verdicts, or try to ignore them.32 The possibility of 
finding and even of making up excuses does in no way infringe upon the impartiality of 
conscience, since excuses only enter after the verdict of conscience and help agents 
                                                 
31 Wanting to serve and praise God without moral sincerity is an “opiate for conscience” and “a cushion” 
on which conscience is meant to “sleep quietly” (IX:495.13-5). In pre-critical lecture notes, Kant speaks of 
“numbing” [übertäuben] and “giving leave” [Ferien geben] to our internal judge (LK:135, see also 
XXVII:357.4-5). 
32 See VI:400.31-33, 401.10-11, 438.13-23.  
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ignore this verdict. 
Agents, however, often look for more than excuses. They also look for justifications, 
in fact, as pointed out above (sec.1.2), agents normally wonder whether what they are 
doing is right or justified, not merely whether they are excused. If it is possible to falsely 
deem oneself justified, not merely excused, it must be possible that the verdict of 
conscience itself can be interfered with. Indeed, Kant clearly states that there can be 
undeserved “peace of conscience” [Gewissensruhe], i.e., conscience itself can be silent 
when it should warn or condemn (VI:38.12-23). An example that we already came across 
is the inquisitor (see my sec.2.1). The inquisitor’s reasoning about duty is not guided by 
the notion of universality. He draws on impure (morally irrelevant) considerations, such 
as “historical documentation” (VI:187.3). He thinks that scripture and tradition can 
inform him about duty and he is convinced that he is justified in his doings.33 
We need to gain a better understanding of how Kant thinks conscience proceeds in 
the critical assessment of an agent’s reasoning. Kant elaborates on his conception of self-
assessment via his metaphor of an “internal court” (VI:438.11).34 Kant’s metaphorical 
use of a court to make a philosophical point is not limited to conscience. For instance, 
Kant prominently conceives of his First Critique as “the true court of justice for all 
controversies of pure reason” (A/B:751/779).35 In his Introduction to the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant calls a judge or court of law a “(natural or moral) person that is authorized 
to impute with rightful force” (VI:227.27-9). Kant here does not distinguish between the 
judge and the court in its entirety (see also VI:317.24-5). What matters here for his 
treatment of conscience is that a court or the judge is the rightful and authorized source 
of imputation. There would be no legal imputation (and hence no legitimate 
punishment) without a court of law. This translates to the moral sphere where 
conscience is presented as the source of imputing actions to oneself and as the capacity 
to critically assess these actions. Furthermore, the idea that conscience is a forum 
internum is prominent in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Initia philosophia practicae 
primae 36, which had great influence on Kant and was used by Kant as a text-book for his 
                                                 
33 See also VI:38.12-7, 174.27-30, 333.33-4, VIII:268.26-269.1 for examples of agents who falsely deem 
themselves morally justified. In the Vigilantius lecture notes, Kant calls the attempt to directly deceive 
conscience “sophistry” and gives a number of short examples (XXVII:619.36-620.8).  
34 See also V:98.13-28, XXVII:197.19-36, 295.12-36, 351.22-357.5, 572.13-573.24.  
35 See Møller (2013) for a recent discussion of judicial metaphors in the First Critique.  
36 See XIX:83.11-35. Baumgarten’s Initia is reprinted in volume XIX of the Academy Edition. 
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lectures.37 
The central idea of the court metaphor for understanding conscience is that the 
accused and the judge cannot be the same person, otherwise the prosecutor would 
always lose (VI:438.29-33). To allow for an impartial evaluation of an agent, Kant 
introduces two distinctions. Firstly, he distinguishes between an agent’s rational self, the 
homo noumenon, who is the “prosecutor” (ibid.439fn.34) of the internal court, and the 
“human being as a sensible being endowed with reason” (ibid.30-1). The latter is the 
accused. Interestingly, Kant here does not mention the homo phaenomenon, the usual 
counterpart of the homo noumenon. This suggests that the accused is not merely the 
agent as an instrumentally rational animal (homo phaenomenon), but the agent as a 
finite moral being or the agent as a whole. This makes sense, since it is the agent 
endowed with empirical practical reason and under the moral law who can transgress 
moral laws and hold herself responsible for it. 
Kant distinguishes between “the human being as a moral being (homo noumenon)” 
and “as a natural being (homo phaenomenon)” (VI:430.14-5).38 Kant emphasizes that the 
distinction is one between different ways of regarding “the same human being” 
(VI:418.17, see also ibid.239.27-8), and that this distinction is only made “in a practical 
respect” (ibid.439.31).39 Kant draws on the distinction between the hominis to explain 
how we can have duties to ourselves (ibid.418.5-23, XXVII:539.1-16, 579.8-23), and to 
remove a supposed contradiction between self-determination and natural causality 
(XXVII:505.31-506.3). Whilst Kant is explicit that the homo phaenomenon is an animal or 
our animal self (VI:418.7), this animal is still rational, albeit only instrumentally rational 
(ibid.5-13). The homo phaenomenon is not a rational moral agent, for him “the concept of 
obligation does not come into consideration” (ibid.16-7). He can only be moved by 
hypothetical imperative, not by categorical ones which require a source of motivation 
independently of inclinations.40 The homo phaenomenon therefore does not have what it 
                                                 
37 See Kuehn (2010, sec.3) for more on Baumgarten’s influence on Kant. 
38 Kant elaborates on his distinction between the hominis elsewhere in the Metaphysics of Morals and in his 
lectures of the 1790s. See VI:239.21-30, 335.17-22, 418.18, 423.5, 434.22-435.5, 439.30-1, XXIII:398.11-2, 
XXVII:579.29-30, 593.6-22. Byrd, Hruschka (2010, ch.14) point to Linné’s Systema Naturae as an 
important scientific influence on Kant for this distinction, as well as to the traditional Roman law 
distinction between a thing and a person. 
39 See VI:239.26, 418.5, 434.32, XXVII:504.29, 505.5, 39, 510.5, 579.17-8. Reath (2013, 269) argues with 
reference to IV:440, VI:418, XXVII:593, 610, 626 that the homo noumenon “is not an obscure metaphysical 
being, but what a human being conceives himself to be according to the Categorical Imperative”. 
40 See Byrd, Hruschka (2010, 281-2): “As a thing, the homo phaenomenon has no duties, which in turn 
means that he has no rights or moral faculties” (ibid.281). However, in the Vigilantius lecture notes, the 
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takes to be the accused before a moral court.41 We should therefore not think of the 
accused before the internal court as the homo phaenomenon but as the agent in the most 
comprehensive sense of the term (animal self, instrumental rationality, subjection to the 
moral law and capability to act from pure practical reason). 
Secondly, Kant distinguishes between the agent or the accused and “someone other” 
(ibid.438.34), whom the agent has to envisage as the “authorised judge of conscience” 
(ibid.439.4): “God” (ibid.13). In §13 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant clarifies the role of 
God for the internal court: God is only a matter of “subjective practical reason”. Nothing 
follows from this practical presupposition for our theoretical use of reason (ibid.439.20-
440.1). A conception of God serves as an “analogy” (ibid.440.2) for us to a holy, i.e., 
morally perfect being. A morally perfect being can serve as a standard, which is ideal and 
independent of the agent’s first-order reasoning. Kant’s hope is that even an agent who 
lacks caution in her exercise of reason will reproach herself, when she considers her use 
of reason from the perspective of a perfect being that never accepts pseudo-justifications 
(see VI:76.25-34, 140.12-26, XXVII:197.24-6). I will argue below that we should 
understand God for the purpose of conscience not as a judge but rather as the standard 
according to which an agent judges herself. An ideal and independent standard is 
necessary for conscience because conscience could not be effective if the agent judges 
her use of rational capacities according to the same standards of rigor that she applies in 
determining what her duty is. If these standards are low, her conscience would never 
issue guilty verdicts, if they are high, conscience would be redundant. 
We also have a “legal adviser (defence counsel)” before the internal court.42 In the 
Kaehler Lecture Notes, the internal advocate is called a “twister of the law” 
[Rechtsverdreher] (LK:201, see also XXVII:359.14). “Rechtsverdreher” is a derogatory 
German term for a lawyer. Rechtsverdreher are members of the legal profession who 
work within the legal framework, but who readily make use of any loophole and 
                                                                                                                                                        
human being in appearance or homo phaenomenon seems to be able to be morally obligated by one’s 
rational self (XXVII:579.8-580.22, 593.1-16, 601.30-5). It certainly is an intricate issue to discern how to 
understand Kant's distinctions between the homines in various places. I will focus on Kant’s official 
account in the Metaphysics of Morals. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. 
41 Sensen (2011, 130) emphasizes that the homo phaenomenon is “the human being as observable in 
experience” and as such entirely a creature of the phenomenal world. The homo noumenon, by contrast, is 
“a moral ideal that might not be observed in experience, but that is prescribed by reason”. For the difficult 
(causal) relationship between the homini when it comes to moral actions see Byrdd, Hruschka (2010, 288-
9). 
42 VI:439.fn.35, see also VI:440.20-4, XXVII:197.30-2, 618.23-4, LK:193, 200. In the Collins lecture notes 
from the 1770s Kant specifies that our “advocate” before the internal court is “self-love”, which “excuses 
[the agent] and makes many an objection to the accusation” (XXVII:354.20-1). 
 18 
ambiguity they can find to further the interests of their clients, or to “make use of the 
letter of the law” to undermine its spirit (LK:201). 
It is important that we do not think of the internal court along the lines of the 
rather silly picture of a number of little agents inhabiting a big agent and arguing with 
each other. Kant aims to describe different standpoints that an agent can take up on 
herself (see VI:439.fn.). The court metaphor captures central elements of how morality 
appears to us: Agents find within themselves an ideal or impartial standard of self-
assessment, which might be different from how they deliberate about their actions on a 
day to day basis (the judge). Agents reproach themselves in the light of this standard, as 
if another person is accusing them (the prosecutor). They can try to come to terms with 
negative self-assessment either via an earnest resolution to improve (or, in the case of ex 
ante conscience, by not performing the intended action), or by retrospectively finding 
grounds of excuses, or, more drastically by twisting the law that functions as a standard 
for self-assessment. Kant’s court metaphor aims to explain how agents can get their 
objective judgments about their duty wrong and yet still take up another perspective on 
themselves that lets them cognize that they were mistaken.   
There is, however, still the danger that Kant’s metaphor of the internal court fails to 
do justice to the fact that we often experience critical reflection as a unity, not as an 
interplay between different perspectives. This is particularly so in easy cases when it 
simply becomes apparent to us that we were wrong. In what follows, I will grant Kant his 
way of speaking of different perspectives as persons with different roles, but I take issue 
with the specific metaphor he uses.43 The court metaphor is unhelpful for understanding 
the process of self-deception about what is justified. It should be clear by now that it is 
difficult to see how the lawyer’s manoeuvres can be successful before the internal court 
when an agent engages in rationalizing. The internal court metaphor suggests that the 
lawyer has to deceive the judge, since the judge pronounces the verdict. This might make 
sense in a real court scenario with a non-ideal judge, but it cannot work if the judge is 
ideal in the way Kant describes. It would make much more sense if the defendant, the 
finite but rational agent, was the target of the lawyer’s deceptive manoeuvres.  
That for rationalizing the focus should be on the defendant is reinforced by a 
second problem. Kant is explicit that self-deception, which rationalizing is a form of, is 
                                                 
43 Schmidt, Schönecker (2014a, 290-1, 301-11, 2014b, 243) criticise the obscurity of Kant’s judicial 
metaphors for the functioning of conscience. I am more optimistic than they are that something can be 
made of Kant’s descriptions if we rationally reconstruct them.  
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“intentional” [vorsetzlich] (VI:430.12-3) and “deserves the strongest censure” (ibid.35-
6). Agents are criticisable for self-deception itself not merely for actions committed when 
self-deceived.44 A self-deceiver is not the passive victim of deception, otherwise she 
would not deserve censure for it. In the court scenario the agent, as the accused, 
however, is passively awaiting a verdict to be passed upon her. It seems that she is doing 
nothing wrong when her lawyer advances pseudo-arguments and exploits loopholes in 
order to deceive or sway the judge. After all, we do not blame defendants for getting 
themselves a smart lawyer (though we disapprove of a legal system in which the quality 
of the lawyer impacts the court’s verdict). Rationalizing can only be the agent’s fault if 
she chooses to listen to the lawyer’s pseudo-arguments and gives in willingly to his 
sophistries. It is noteworthy that this second problem persists even if we are skeptical 
that agents can really imagine an ideal judge. Even if we admit that the judge of 
conscience can be non-ideal, we can only explain how self-deception is possible, not how 
we can hold agents responsible for it, unless we admit that it is the agent who chooses to 
give in to the more appealing story the lawyer has to offer. 
Both problems reveal the underlying issue that Kant’s notion of the internal court 
cannot adequately account for the possibility of self-deception as something the agent 
herself is responsible for. Kant, however, might not have intended to do this. It is 
important that Kant does not say that conscience is (identical to) an internal court. He 
only claims that conscience is the “consciousness” of an internal court (VI:438.10, see 
also XXVII:197.19-36) or a way to cash out how conscience appears to us. Kant himself 
might not be unhappy to abandon his model of an internal court for the purpose of 
talking about self-deception, if there is a better way to understand this process and if this 
way also preserves the idea that agents can critically reflect on their objective 
judgements.  
Before I suggest such a better way, I will address a potential critical reply to my 
argument so far. One might think that it is a mistake to take Kant’s metaphor at face 
value. Maybe we should take it with a grain of salt, not pick it apart the way I did. I think 
it is important to bear in mind, however, that the metaphor has an important function for 
Kant. The metaphor of the internal court is supposed to show that and how it is 
conceivable that agents can get their objective judgments wrong, but yet take up a 
                                                 
44 Self-deception is in any case a violation of the “First Command of all Duties to oneself […] know 
(scrutinize, fathom) yourself” (VI:441.2-4). See Ware (2009) for more on the duty to know oneself and the 
danger of self-deception. 
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perspective on themselves that allows them to become aware of their mistakes and to 
correct them. Kant must offer a story as to how we can imagine this to happen, 
otherwise his idea that objective and subjective judgments can diverge seems 
unwarranted or ad hoc. I will now show that there is indeed a way to conceive of self-
assessment, according to which agents can critically and impartially assess themselves 
whilst rationalizing is still possible and a constant threat. I acknowledge that my solution 
might not satisfy those who are unhappy with Kant’s original way of talking about 
different perspectives to begin with, but I maintain that at least within the Kantian 
explanatory framework my approach does a better job at accounting for self-deception 
than Kant’s own does. 
In an essay on self-deception and the role of philosophy in Kant, Lucas Thorpe 
(2006, 468) brings up an interesting idea that can be developed into an answer to the 
question of how rationalizing can be met with success before conscience and how an 
agent can be responsible for it. Thorpe suggests that the agent might “choose to listen to 
the defense attorney and try to block out the voice of the judge”, and that the voice of the 
judge might be “drowned out by the pleading voice of the defense attorney” (ibid.). Self-
deception here appears as a lack of attention to the incorruptible standard, and undue 
attention to the wrong source (ibid.469-70). The original standard is still present but, 
due to interference, eclipsed or bracketed.45  Even though Thorpe seems to be unaware 
of this and he does not develop his thought, he has in mind, I think, rather an internal 
panel-discussion than a court. Rationalizing is the agent’s fault, since she herself chose to 
listen to the lawyer’s pseudo-arguments. In an actual court, however, it does not matter 
for the verdict to whom the defendant pays attention. The notion of an internal panel-
discussion seems more fruitful to understand rationalizing than the internal court does. 
Self-assessment, according to the panel-discussion-model, means that the judge 
determines the standard of justification an action has to meet in order for it to be 
rationally evaluated as morally permissible (or even as obligatory). This standard is the 
strictness and purity of the moral law. The prosecutor argues that an agent’s reasoning 
about a specific case does or did not proceed with sufficient caution in implementing 
this standard. The corresponding moral judgement hence is doubtful and a proposed or 
                                                 
45 This conception is supported by VI:430.27-35 where self-deception is described not as requiring the 
active interaction of different faculties of an agent’s mind but rather as an agent giving in to biases. In the 
pre-critical Kaehler/Collins lecture notes it is pointed out that human beings have a tendency to rather 
“listen” to their internal advocate than to their prosecutor (LK:193, XXVII:354.28-9).  
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already committed action might be wrong. The defence attorney argues against the 
prosecutor. It is then up to the agent to discover whether the prosecutor or the defence 
attorney present a more compelling case and whether the way she reasoned about an 
intended or performed action was in line with the standards established by the judge. 
The responsibility for the final verdict here is shifted from the judge to the accused. 
Rationalizing on the model of an internal panel means that the defence attorney – or, less 
metaphorically, the agent when taking up this position – questions the standards of the 
debate and suggests criteria, which are more lenient than those of the judge and more in 
line with how other agents live their lives, with social norms and customs, religious 
practices, etc. “Successful” rationalizing means that agents chose to listen to their lawyer 
more than the lawyer’s arguments warrant, instead of to the prosecutor, and even makes 
the lawyer’s standards temporarily the standards of her self-assessment. The lawyer 
here appears as a sophist who tries to convince the agent by all means possible to 
bracket the standards she rationally acknowledges as the right ones.46 
Kant himself, when he claims in the Religion that reason or the inner judge cannot 
be bribed, adds the caveat that if the agent appeals to “another judge, of whom news will 
be had through sources of information elsewhere” the agent will have much “to counter 
the judge’s severity under the pretext of human frailty” and can hope to “mollify” this 
judge (VI:77.27-35). This represents another sense in which the verdicts of conscience 
might be infallible. The verdicts of conscience are always accurate according to the 
standards of self-assessment that prevail at the time. These standards are, however, not 
always those of the judge. If an agent listens to a less than ideal standard for her self-
appraisal, if the agent makes the more convenient standards proposed by her lawyer the 
standards of her self-assessment, she might believe herself justified before conscience, 
even when she is not.47  
Kant’s chief aim in those passages that call into question the success of 
rationalizing is to stress that rationalizing can never be completely successful. An agent 
can never invent a story that truly justifies a moral transgression. Furthermore, an agent 
can never invent a story that is so persuasive that it numbs the voice of conscience 
entirely, or that the rationalizer is completely and whole-heartedly certain that what she 
                                                 
46 In the lecture notes Powalski, presumably from around 1782/3, the activity of our internal advocate is 
explicitly called “sophistry” (XXVII:197.36.). 
47 According to pre-critical lectures, the judgements of conscience are infallible, unless conscience uses a 
false standard of judgement (LK:193-4, XXVII:354.26-8). 
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is doing is right and that she could not have known that it was wrong. The judge or the 
ideal standard do not disappear, they are merely temporarily silenced by demagogy. Kant 
believes that every rational agent, no matter how much she has previously engaged in 
rationalizing, can be intellectually upright and uncover her mistakes, if she earnestly 
reflects on her reasoning in the light of purely rational standards. Making a habit of this 
uprightness is what Kant demands when he claims that while we cannot have a duty to 
have conscience, we do have an indirect duty to cultivate conscience (VI:401.19-25).48 
We have a duty to face pangs of conscience in their full severity and to amend our future 
reasoning and acting accordingly (see VI:401.19-21) without looking for excuses, let 
alone foisting biased standards on our self-assessment. 
 
Conclusion 
My interpretation of conscience as a reflective watch-dog and internal panel is the 
attempt to understand conscience based on two important aspects of Kant’s philosophy: 
The way rational agents can come to know of their duty and their propensity to self-
deception. There is a tension between Kant’s emphasis that self-deception is a pervasive 
part of human existence and his optimism that conscience can never be fully deceived. 
My solution is firstly to abandon the notion of an internal court as a model for self-
deception, and to rather think of conscience on the model of an internal panel. Secondly, 
we should understand Kant as maintaining that rational agents always could have known 
that they are mistaken just as they always could have known on a first-order level what 
their duty was, but that they can also fail to do so. The fundamental fault of the 
rationalizer is that she does not make the purity and strictness of the moral law the focal 
point of her deliberation. If she did, she would see through the spuriousness of the 
considerations her lawyer advances.  
My discussion also reveals something important about rationalizing. Rationalizing 
interferes with first-order reasoning about duty and it also manifests itself as internal 
sophistry even in moments of calm and critical reflection about one’s reasoning. This 
double function is due to the reflective function of conscience. If conscience does not err 
unless false standards are assumed and if it can warn every time an agent reasons with 
lack of caution, the rationalizer must take rationalizing to the next, the reflective, level, 
                                                 
48 See also VI:399.4-14. See Timmermann (2006, sec.2-3) for a discussion of the normative status of 
indirect duty. 
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since otherwise self-deception could not make the agent feel moral. 
There are certainly questions left open by my treatment of conscience and 
rationalizing. A particularly engaging one is whether it is only the advocate or also the 
prosecutor who can overshoot. After all, some agents might be excessively self-critical 
and concerned with their moral propriety beyond the ordinary.49 Can for such an agent a 
certain amount of rationalizing sophistry be necessary for a balanced self-assessment? 
Or, more generally: Just because something is sophistical and biased does not mean that 
it cannot be right. Is rationalizing only a distortion of self-assessment, or can it also 
sometimes help us discover something about our own reasoning?  
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